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When each of n judges ranks a set A of m objects from best to worst, and s= (~1, . .. ,sm) is a 
decreasing sequence of real numbers, the collective ranking determined by s orders the objects in 
A according to their total scores. The total score of x equals p times the number of judges w’ho 
rank x in pth place, summed over p. 
For normalization purposes, let S, denote the set of all decreasing s = (~1, . .. , s,,J for which 
s,_)=l and+,= 0. Given any mr3, we show first that if s and s’ in S, are not identical, then 
some profile of judges’ rankings yields a linear collective order for s’ that is the reverse or dual of 
the linear collective order for s. 
We then consider eversals in collective rankings when one object is removed from A. Suppose 
sisinS,andtisinS,_l, with m L 3. A simple constructive proof shows that there is a profile of 
judges’ rankings on A which yields a collective linear order for s such that, when any pre-specified 
object in A is removed, t yields the reverse ranking on the remaining m - 1 objects. More detailed 
results are derived for m = 3, and shown to depend on the nature of s = (~1, 1,O). In particular, the 
sum-of-ranks procedure with SI = 2 permits fewer reversals than any other s1> 1. 
I. Introduction 
Suppose ach of n judges ranks a set A of HJ objects from best to worst, resulting 
in a list R=(al,..., nn) of asymmetric linear orders on A. For each a E A, let nap be 
the number of terms (judges) in n that rank object a in pth place, and let 
w(a) = (&lr . . . s n,), with Cp nap - n. Given an m-dimensional real vector s, the score 
of ad under s operating on R is the inner product so n(a), and S(Z) is the binary 
relation on A defined by 
as(lr)b iff s+a)>sw(b). 
The relation s(n) can be thought of as a collective ranking with ties allowed, as 
deternlined by the score vector s = (SI, . . . , sm) operating on theprofile 71 = (XI, . . . , nn) 
of linear orders on A. Clearly, if cy > 0 and /? are real numbers, and as + fl is defined 
as (ccsl +jY, l , asm+j3), then s(n)=(crs+fl)(~). Becau<:e of this and the fact that I 
shall work only with monotone decreasing score vectors, we shall normalize by 
letting 
and work henceforth with this set of score vectors for each m ~2. I shall also let 
n(A) denote the set of all nonempty finite lists (profiles) of linear orders on :4. 
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When A = {al, . . . , am}, a linear order with ai in first place, aj in second place, l . . , 
and a& in last place will be written as aiaj l *. a&. Thus, ni= ala2 l ** am indicates that 
judge i ranks a1 first, a2 second, and so forth. When s(n) =.auz2 l *a m, the collective 
ranking S(X) is the linear order a1 . ..am with no ties; i.e., a$(z)ai+~ for 
i= 1,2 ,..., m- 1. 
Collective ranking procedures date at least from Borda [l, 31, who proposed the 
sum-of-rahrks score vector, which in terms of Sm is (m - 1, m - 2, l m* 9 1,O). Borda’s 
pro&ure has been recently axiomatized [S, 13,‘ 151 and noted to possess several 
important properties, some of which will be mentioned later. Other recent 
axiomatizations of positional scoring rules for determiniilg a collective ranking or a 
subset of “best” objects [4, 9, 14, 16, 171 have rekindled interest in these 
procedures. 
The present paper has two main purposes. The first is to prove that if s,s’E Sm and 
s+s’, which requires m z 3, then there is a profile n in H({al, . . . , am}) 
s'(Ic)=~~ l azal. Thus, not only can different s and s’ in Sm 
reverse the collective ranking between two objects in A = {al, . . . , am}, but they can 
reverse <the collective ranking between all pairs of objects. 
The second purpose is to consider reversals in the collective ranking produced by 
SE Sm when a prespecified object is removed from every order in A and a score 
vector t E S m - 1 is applied to the modified profile. We shall use a simple constructive 
proof to show that, given any mr3 with A={a1, . . . ,am}, and given any 
kE(l,..., m}, SE& and teS m- 1, there is a it en(A) for which s(7c) =a1a2~~~ a,% 
and t(n with a& removed) = am ..* a&+ la&-. 1 l al. A detailed analysis for m = 3 
shows that the number of k for which a single n can produce a reversal on removal 
of a& depends on s: in particula,r, ifs is not the Borda score vector in S3, then there is 
a II E U({al, a2, a3)) for which s(n) = aItiza3 and for which t = (1,0) ranks a2 before a1 
when a3 is removed, ranks a3 before al when a2 is removed, and ranks a3 before a2 
when al is removed. However, when s is the Borda vector in S3, this is impossible. 
The latter purpose is related to several recent studies, all of which are based on 
Borda vectors or the sum-of-ranks procedure. Davidson and Odeh [2] develop 
conditions for profiles on A under which the second-ranked object in A is not 
ranked first in ,.4 \ (x} after the initial first-ranked object XE A is removed from the 
profiles. Fishburn [8] proves for each m 2 3 that there is a n E n(A) with x ranked 
first such that x does not rank or tie for first in any proper subset B of A which 
contains x und at least one other object, except for one such subset with two 
elements. And Fishburn [7] shows that there are profiles that yield a linear Borda 
ranking on A such that, when either the first-place or last-place object in the Borda 
ranking is removed, the new Borda ranking on the remaining objects is inverted or 
reversed. He did not prove, however, that both reversals can result from the same II, 
which is an immediate corollary of Theorem 2 in the present paper. 
Although constructive proofs are often preferred for the types of results noted 
here, I shall rely on several indirect proofs because of their efficiency. The latter 
proofs will be based on the following linear separation oi duality lemma, often 
referred to as a version of the Theorem of The Alternative [a]. 
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Lemma 1. Suppose xl, . . . , xM are K-dimensional real vectors with Mz 1. Then 
EITHER there is a nonnegative K-dimensionai rea! vector q for which 
tpxb0 for j= I,... ,M, 
OR there are nonnegative real numbers rl, . . . , rM, at least one of which is positive, 
such that 
M 
C &SO for k= 1, . . ..K. 
i=l 
The two alternatives in the lemma are mutually exclusive. Moreover, it should be 
clear that the first holds if and only if it is true for some q that is composed entirely 
of positive integers. The latter fact will be used to establish the existence of certain 
profiles. 
2. Inversions with no removals 
As noted above, our first purpose will be to prove 
Theoreml. Supposemz3, ~A~=m,andA={a~,...,am}.Ifs,s’~Smandsfs’, then 
there is a II E n(A) such that &c(n) =ala2 .*. am and s’(7c) =am 0.. a2a1. 
Proof. Givenmr3andA={ai,..., am}, let the m! linear orders on A be indexed by 
1 through m! and let a profile n en(A) be represented by an rn!-tuple 
~=Ob... nm!), where nk is the number of terms in n that equal the kth linear order. 
Thus each q is a finite sequence of nonnegative integers, with c nkZ 1. 
Given SE Sm, s(n) = ala2 l e= am is tantamount o the system of inequalities 
rW4,a: , . . . ,a;!)>0 for a&)a2, 
rl l (a?, aI , l . . ,a:,)>0 for a2s(n)aJ, 
. . 
. . 
;I~(a~-l,a~-l,...,ammrl)>(, ‘for a,ll-Is(n)am, 
where a: equals sp- s9 when object ai occupies position p and object ai+ I occupies 
position Q in the kth linear order. Similarly, 3’(n) = aInant - 1 l -- a; is tantamount to the 
system 
tl.(b!,b: , . . . , bjn!)>O for a2;‘( 7t)a 1, 
tl*(b:,b; , m-0 ,bf,,!W for a3s1(7z)a2. 
. . 
;.(b;-’ ,b!/-l,...,b$-')>O ;br a,,s’(n)a,Pl-l, 
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where bk equals ; - s6 when object ai occupies position p and ai+ 1 occupies position 
q in the kth linear order. 
It follows from Lemma 1 that the combined system of 2(m - 1) strict inequalities 
has no q solution that corresponds to some profile R if and only if there are non- 
negative real numbers al, . . . , am- t,jR, ,-. , pm-- I (associated with the inequalities in 
the order listed above), at least one of which is positive, such that 
~‘q,a~+m~1#3,&~0 fork=l,...,m!. 
p=t p=I 
Given s#ss’ with a,~0 and&- ‘0 for all p, we sh:;911 prove that this alternative system 
of m ! nonstrict inequalities is consistent iff‘ Q = &, = 0 for p = 1, . . . , m - 1. Since this 
violates the condition that some CY,, or /JP is to be strictly positive, it follows that there 
isanEn(A)forwhichs(~)=al~~~amands’(~)=am~~~alwhenm~3ands#sr. 
AsstJme henceforth in this proof that ~3:s’ and that the foregoing system of 
nonstrict inequalities is valid with a+0 and &r 0 for all p. Since all m! linear 
orders are used in our formulation, C k a f = xk bf = 0 for each p, so that, when the 
left hand sides of the preceding system are summed over ks we get 
m-l m-l 
c ap& c #wf 
p=l p=l 
Consequently, the preceding system is valid if and only if 
m-l 
C (apaf+/Jpbf)=O for k=l,...,m!. 
p=l 
We shall show that this implies al =fll= 0, then az=/h= 0, and so forth, so that 
aP=flP=O for allp. 
To prove that aI =/?I =O, let II,, be the set of all linear orders on A that have a1 in 
position p. There are (m - I)! orders in IQ,, and when a1 is suppressed in these 
orders, we have the symmetric permutation group of all linear orders on 
(a2 , . l . , a,,}. Since p is in a fixed position in IIP and since all q > 1 deal with collective 
comparisons that do not involve al, it follows that 
c 
kch, 
a,Q= C bz=O forq=2,3 ,..., m-l. 
kehp 
By the positioning of a1 and the equally frequent placement of a2 in positions other 
than p in IIP, 
C ai=(m- l)! s,-(m-2)! (j, Si-Sp), 
ke4p 
C b:=(m-2)! 
ke 4, (.f, .:-sh) 
-(m- l)! s>. 
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Hence, on summing the final equations of the preceding paragraph over IJp, we get 
=at[(m- l)! Sg-(m-2)! (CSi-Sp)] 
+1[(m-l)! sl,-(m-2)! (Cs:-s’plJ=O. 
This gives us m equalities between a J and 61, the last two of which (p = M - l,p = m) 
are, after cancellation of (m - 2)!, 
C Si =/JI (m-l)- 1 s: , 
km- 1 1 [ icm- I 1 
Si-I 1 [ =bJ O- C s:- 1 . icm- 1 I 
When the second of these is subtracted from the first, we get a Jm =B Jm, or a J = BJ. 
Suppose a J = /9J > 0. Then succeeding differences between p-adjacent equalities for 
al and /31 give sr -s~=s’~ -4, SZ-SJ=S$-sj, . . . ,sm-2- 1 =sL_~- 1, where 
l=Sm-l=S~_1. But then, working backwards through these differences, we get 
s = s’, a contradiction. Hence a J = BJ = 0. 
To prove that a2 = /?2 = 0, we let 1~~ be the set of all linear orders on A that have 472 
in position p. The proof then proceeds exactly as in the preceding paragraph, except 
that in summing over k E r2, to get the set of m equalities between a2 and /%, the al 
and #31 terms vanish not because CI, a: = C I,b: = 0 but because fit1 = PI = 0. The m 
equalities between a2 and 82 are the same as the (a J$J) equalities, except hat a2 and 
/#2 replace a J and flJ, so we conclude from this step that a2=/?2= 0.
The proof then proceeds in the indicated manner through successive (aP,j!3P) pairs 
and shows that aP=&,=Oforp= l,...,m- 1. 0 
3. Inversions with one removal 
We shall prove next a general inversion theorem which involves the remova{ of 
one object in A = {al, . . . . am} from a profile n en(A). To supplement previous 
notation, we shall let n \ a’denote the profile in l7(A \ {a}) that is obtained from 
II E n(A) after object a is removed from every term in 71. 
Theorem 2. Suppose mz3, SE&, &&I--J, IA)=m and A=(aJ,...,a& Then 
there is a KEPT for which s(n)=aJa2~*8am, t(n \aJ)=amam-J~~~a2, and 
t(71\ am)=am-4 l ‘*a2aJ. Moreover, for each ke (2, . . ..m- 11, there is a XEIT(A) 
for which S(R) =a1a2 leaa,,,andt(n \ ak)=amn~~ak+Jak-J8g-aJ. 
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Proof. For any linear order ~1.~2 l .aXN, let 
C(XlX2 l *~XN)=(XlX2***XN,XNXl •~gXN-lrggg,X~3*~*X~XI), 
the cyclic list of N linear orders, each of which beyond the first is obtained from its 
predecessor by shifting the last-place object into first place. 
For the first conclusion of the theorem, let R consist of M repetitions of 
C(a, g*s al) plus a final order al •~. ant. Thus, R has Mm + 1 terms. The score for each 
ai within C(a,**e al) is si +s2+ l em +Sm, due to its cyclic (latin square) arrangement. 
Hence s(n) = al l .0 am since ~(71) depends ccmpletely on the final order in R. When am 
is removed from II, n \ cpfn consists of A4 repetitions of C(am- 1 .*a al), plus M 
repetitions of am - I l aI (the extra order obtained from each original C(am*a* al)), 
plus al l .m am - 1 as the final order. The cyclic nature of C(am- 1 l .0 Al), along with 
t1>tz> ..* > tm- I= 0, guarantees that ?(K \ am) = am- I l . . a1 for sufficiently large M 
In a Gmilar manner, n \ al consists of A4 repetitions of C(f#m ... 49, plus A4 
repetitions of am l *e a2, plus the final order a2 l . . am. Hence t(nr \ al) = am l e* ~2 for 
large 44. A suitable value of M then produces both inversions. 
Given 1 c k< m for the final conclusion of the theorem, let R consist of M 
repetitions of C(ak@m..’ ak+ ia&- f l al), plus a fina; bzder alu2 ...czrn. As before, 
s(z) = a1422 l ** am. Since n \ ak consists of M repetitions of C(am l -m ak+ IUk- 1 l al), 
@us hd repetitions of am l *= ak+ la& 1 l al, plus al l ak- lak+ 1 l am, a sufficiently 
large Mgives t(n \ak)=am**.ak+lak-l ***al. El 
Given s(n) = al l *. am, Theorem 2 shows that we can get an inversion with the 
same n when either al or am is removed - which strengthens the Borda inversion 
result in [7], but that different n’s may be needed for intermediate f%. We shall 
consider this further in the next section for m = 3 after stating an easy corollary of 
Theorem 2. 
Although the proof of Theorem 2 does not depend on special features of s and t 
other than monotonicity, the M values needed to produce the inversions generally 
depend on the spacing between the ti values. In particular, it is easily seen that M is 
“sufficiently large” in each instance iff 
M(tj-tj-I)>(tm-I-j-tm-j) forj=l,...,m-2. (*) 
Let Sm- I(M) be the set of all I E Sm- I for which (*) holds. 
corollary 1. Suppose mz3, SESm, IAl=m and A=(al,...,a,& Then there is a 
fixed n EI;I(A) with Mm +- 1 terms for which S(K) =a~ •~~ am, and for which 
t(7i \ al)=am- a2 and t(n \ am) = am- 1 l -- aI for every t E Sm- I(M). Moreover, if 
I< k < m, then there is a fixed n E n(s) with Mm -I- 1 terms for which s(x) = al l .9 am, 
and for which t(n \ ak) =am s.e ak+ lak- I l a1 for every tE Sm- l(M). 
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4. Detailed results for m = 3 
It is natural to ask whether some profile can yield inversions on A \ {ak} for 
combinations of uk not covered by Theorem 2. Altho71gh such questions will be left 
open for general m, our next heorem shows the full extent of inversions with the 
removal of one object when m = 3. 
Theorem 3. Let (A( = 3 with A = {al, a2, a3). If SE S3 and sl # 2, then there is a 
it EII(A) for which s(n) = ala2a3, t(a \ al) = a3a2, t(n \ a2) = a3al and t(z \ a3) = 
a2al. However, if SE& and s1=2, then no n EJ;((A) with s(z) =alaza3 has both 
t(lr \ al) =a342 and t(z \ a2) =asai, and no n E l&4) with s(a) =a~aza~ has both 
t(a \ a2) =asal and t(n \ as) =azal. 
Remark* s1 = 2 identifies the Borda vector in Sj. Hence all possible inversion 
combinations for Borda with m=3 are covered by Theorem 2. However, as 
Theorem 3asserts, ifs is any other vector in $3, then some 7t with s(z) = ala2a3 has 
a3 beating both al and a2 by simple majorities, and also has a2 beating at by a simple 
majority. Other special features of Borda score vectors will be noted after we prove 
Theorem 3. 
Proof. Let A = {al, a2, a3), s = (A, 1,0) with 1> 1, and let 7t consist of 
i? la203 terms, 
n2 a14342 terms, 
n3 a24143 terms, 
n4 a2a3al terms, 
n5 a30102 terms, 
n6 aja2al terms, 
with rf=(nl,..., n6). Then als(z)az, a&r)a3, t(n \ al) = a3a2, t(n \ az) = a3al and 
t(z \ a$ = a2a1 are respectively equivalent to the following five inequalities: 
q*(n- 1,a, 1 -A, -1,1, -l)>(d, 
rJ*(l, -1JJ - 1, -a, 1 -A)>O, . . 
?p(-l,l, -1, -l,l, l)>O, 
q*(-1, -1, -l,l, f, l)>O, 
rp(-1, -l,l, 1, -l,l)>O. 
Lemma 1 then implies that no profile R ELI(A) simultaneously atisfies ai’l five 
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inequalities iff there are nonnegative ri for i= 1, . . . ,5, at least one of which is 
positive, such that 
rl(A- l)+r2 -r3-rs-rsso, 
rd - r2 
rl(l -J)+rzrt 
-rlA +r2(A - 1)--3+r4+r510, 
rl - r2il 
-n +r2(l -A)+r3+r4+r5sO. 
We show first that this system is consistent only if il = 2, thus proving the st +2 
part of Theorem 2. Addition of the third and fifth inequalities gives rl(2 -i1)~0, 
which requires rr =O if 2>L Suppose 2 >A and the system is consistent. Then 
addition of the first and last inequalities gives r2(2 - A) ~0, hence r2= 0. But then 
rl = r2 = 0 requires r3 = r4 = rs = 0 in thti final inequality, so that no ri> 0. In a similar 
manner, addition of the second and fourth ri inequalities gives r2(A - 2)10, which 
requires rt = 0 if A > 2. Suppose A. >2 and the system is consistent. With r2=0, 
addition of the first and last inequalities gives rl(jl - 2) SO, hence rt = 0, so again the 
final inequality requires r3 = r4 = r5 = 0. 
Now consider sr = A = 2. Then one specific instance of consistency for the ri system 
is (0, . . . , r5) = (2,4,3,3,0). Since r5 =O, this means that there is no nonnegative q
solution to the first four inequalities in the 0 system, which mean that no R with 
~(75) =alc12a3 can yield both a3t(n \ al)a2 and aJt(n \ az)al. Another ri solution is 
(49 2,0,3,3), which with r3 = 0 means that there is no nonnegative q solution to that 
system when its third inequality is deleted. Hence no n with s(n) = ala2a3 can yield 
both a$(tr \ a2)al and azt(n \ aj)al. III 
Theorem 3 identifies a sense in which the Borda score vector is the vector in S3 
that is most resistant o inversions in the collective ranking when one object is 
removed. Previous research has singled out the Borda vector as unique in other 
ways. I shall mention four such results here. Several others are noted in [IO, 121. 
We shall say that II E II(A) has a majority object x iff, for every y E A \ {x}, more 
terms in n rank x ahead of y than rank y ahead of x. A proof of the first result is 
given in [14]. It bears obvious similarities to Theorem 3, 
Result 1. Suppose m 2 3 and IA) = m. Ifs is the Borda vector in Sm, then for every 
n E I7(A ) that Las a majority object x, there is some y E A for which xs(~)y. Ifs E Sm 
is not the Borda vector, then there is a n E R(A) with majority object x such that 
ys(n)xfor allyeA \ {x}. 
For the second result, we take m = 3 and let s = (A, 1, 09, with A > 1, as in the proof 
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of Theorem 3. Let &(A) for each odd n 2 1 equal the number of n-term profiles in 
Z?((al,az, 43)) that have a majority object which also ranks first in S(R), divided by 
the number of n-term profiles in l7({al, a2, as)) th:it have a majority object. The 
following result is implied by Theorem 1 in [ 111. 
Result 2. If A # 2, then there is a positive integer N such that /I&) >&(A) for all 
odd n>N. 
Thus, in the limit as n-o, the Borda vector in S3 maximizes coincidence between 
the majority object and the s(n) winner, given that a majority object exists. 
Our third result is also based on n-o. It applies to either m = 3 or m = 4 and is 
provedin [12]. FormE{3,4}, takeA={at,...,am}. Let y&i,j)forsESmandi<j 
in {IA . . . , m} be the number of n-term profiles in 27(A) for which s(n) = ala2 l am 
and for which ai has a strict simple majority over aj, divided by the number of n- 
term profiles in n(A) for which s(n) =ala2 l a- am. Then let ~(8, i j) be the limiting 
value of y&, i, j) as n+ 00. 
Result 3. If m E { 3,4} and 1 d i< j= m, then the Borda vector in Sm maximizes 
~(4 i,j)= 
Result 3 shows that, for m E { 3,4}, the Borda vector maximizes the likelihood (as 
measured by limit ratios) that the majority relation between any two objects in -4 
will be the same as its relation in s(a). 
Our final result extends this non-reversal result to the removal of one object from 
A = {al, a2, a3, as}. It is the only result mentioned in this section that does not 
directly involve the majority relation. Given (s, t) E SIX S3, let B= {al,az,aJ}, and 
let ~(s, t, B) be the limit as n +oo of the number of n-term profiles in Z?(A) whose 
t(lt \ ~4) ranking on B is the same as the ranking on B induced by S(X) on 
A = {al, 42, a3, ad}, divided by the number of n-term profiles in n(A). There is no 
restriction here on the S(R) ranking. For example, it could be a3a4ala2, in which case 
its induced ranking on B is ujala2; we have agreement between this induced ranking 
and the t(n \ 04) ranking iff the latter is also a3ala2. The following is part of 
Theorem 3 in [12]. 
Result 4. p(s, t, B) is uniquely maximized over (s, t) E S4 x S3 when s is the Borda 
vector in S4 and t is the Borda vector in S3. 
It is hoped of course that the limited conclusions drawn in Theorem 3 and in 
Results 2, 3 and 4 will someday be generalized to all m 2 3. 
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